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EVIDENCE
CHARLM H. RANDALL, JR.*
HEARSAY
P evious Testimony
In the case of Gaines 'v. Thomas1 a question was raised as to
the scope of the well-recognized exception to the hearsay rule for
testimony at a previous trial. Arguably, testimony at a former
trial is not hearsay at all, since it was given under oath and
subject to cross examination.. American courts, however, have
classified such testimony as hearsay, and early cases developed
a fairly restricted exception permitting admission into evidence
of some such testimony. 2 The orthodox statement of the rule was
that "evidence given on a former trial of the same action, or a
former action involving the same issues between the same parties,
is admissible if it be established that the witness is dead."3
The history of this exception to the hearsay rule since its outlines
became settled in that formula has been one of steady attack upon
and erosion of the limitations of "same issues," "same parties,"
and death of the declarant.
The facts of the Gaines case may be quickly stated, as they
relate to this point. An automobile driven by one Martin and a
truck owned by Peerless Mattress Company (Peerless) and
driven by one Byars collided in October of 1957. Plaintiff Gaines
was working on the shoulder of the highway near the point of
impact, and was injured. Martin was killed, and Thomas ap-
pointed as his administrator. Thomas as administrator sued Peer-
less in a federal court for the alleged wrongful death of Martin.
In that action (case I) Byars testified for Peerless and was
cross-examined by counsel for Thomas. Gaines then brought an
action (case II) against Thomas, in his representative capacity.
Before this action came to trial, Byars, the truck driver, had
died. Gaines offered in evidence in case II (Gaines v. Thomas)
a transcript of the testimony of Byars given in case I (Thomas
v. Peerless). The testimony of Byars related to the question of
* Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.
1. 241 S.C. 412, 128 S.E.2d 692 (1962).
2. UNIFORM RULESS OF EVIDENCE rule 63, begins as follows: "Hearsay
Evidence Excluded-Exceptions. Evidence of a statement which is made other
than by a witness while testifying at the hearing offered to prove the truth of
the matter stated is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible except: [the excep-
tions follow]"
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which vehicle had been negligently operated, causing the acci-
dent-specifically, which had swerved across the center line of
the road.
Here the issues are the same, and the witness at the previous
trial is deceased, but the parties are not the same. Hence under
the rule as stated in the Mclnturff case4 the testimony would
be inadmissible. The trial judge admitted the transcript of
Byars' testimony over objection, and the Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Brailsford, affirmed. Citing Dean McCor-
mick's masterly one-volume work,5 Justice Brailsford adopted
the view that the rationale of the limitations expressed in the
usual statement of the former testimony rule was to afford pro-
tection and fairness to the person against whom the evidence
was being offered. Probing for the underlying principle, the court
found that the facile statement that the litigation must be be-
tween the same parties is inadequate :"
The admission of Byars' testimony at this trial was equally
as free of the objections to hearsay evidence as its use at
a retrial of the former action would have been. The facts with
which we deal jibe with the rationale of the rule letting in
former testimony. The 'convenient phrase' [same parties]
must yield to the underlying principle that properly tested,
relevant testimony of a deceased witness should be available
to the jury, when no, unfairness to the adverse party is in-
volved. The testimony falls within this principle and was
properly admitted.
The broadest statement of the reasons underlying most7 of
the exceptions to the hearsay rule is that some strong necessity
exists for use of the hearsay evidence and some safeguard exists
as to its credibility.8 The necessity in the instant case arises in
the unavailability of the witness because of his death. Can we
say that the testimony was subject to safeguards as complete
as we could ask, especially when compared with other exceptions
to the hearsay rule, since the testimony at the first trial was
under oath, and subject to cross-examination? If this approach
were adopted, analyzing the reliability of the testimony rather
4. Ibid.
5. McCoIIci on EVIDENCE § 232 (1954 ed.).
6. 241 S.C. 412, 418, 128 S.E.2d 695 #696, (1962).
7. The exception for "admissions" of a party has a different rationale, not
unlike that adopted by the court in the instant case. Morgan, Admissions as an
Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YAL L. J. 355 (1921).
8. 5 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 1420-1427 (3d ed. 1940).
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than the approach adopted by the Court a broader exception
might emerge. It is to be noted that if Byars, the witness, had
given testimony favorable to Thomas in the first case, had then
died, and Thomas rather than Gaines had offered the testimony
in the second action, it would not be admissible under the ra-
tionale of the rule as articulated by the Supreme Court. Some
highly respected writers9 would extend the prior testimony ex-
ception to embrace even such a case as suggested, putting em-
phasis not on fairness to the opponent in the sense that he person-
ally had a chance to cross-examine, but on the fact that some
opponent had an opportunity and a strong motive to cross-
examine.
Martin v. Southern Railway Co.1° does not appear to constitute
a ruling by the Supreme Court on the former testimony rule.
There the transcript of testimony taken at a hearing between the
same parties, at which both sides presented testimony, was re-
ceived by the trial judge, but was not published to the jury. The
judge received it to give him a more complete picture in ruling
on a motion for directed verdict. He granted this motion; the
Supreme Court reversed on grounds not here pertinent. The
court observed that admission of the transcript to the trial judge,
without publication to the jury, was not prejudicial to the
plaintiff.
Official Statements
This important and often overlooked exception to the hearsay
rule" was applied in State v. Homewood.12 Defendant was con-
victed of violating a statute's prohibiting fraud and misrepre-
sentation in the sale of securities. The trial judge refused to ad-
mit in evidence certain documents proffered by the defense, in-
cluding a routine report of examination of the affairs of the
company of which defendant was president and treasurer. The
sale of shares of this company was the subject of the indictment.
The report, to the South Carolina Insurance Department for the
year 1960, had found no important discrepancies in the books of
9. The broad statement of MODEL CODE of EVIDENiCz rule 511 would permit
the trial judge to admit the testimony in this situation. The more narrow rule
expressed in UNIFoaR RULES OF EVmENCE rule 63 (3), drafted by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, is in accord with the
statement of Justice Brailsford.
10. 240 S.C. 460, 126 S.E.2d 365 (1962).
11. MCCORmICK note 5 supra, §§ 291-295.
12. 241 S.C. 231, 128 S.E.2d 98 (1962).
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the company, although the indictment was based on such dis-
crepancies. The Supreme Court held that the report was inad-
missible as irrelevant, or only slightly relevant, but in any event,
found it did not come within the "official statements" exception.
Again the court cited the rule of Oommonwealtk v. Slavski'4 as
stating the correct rule applicable to this exception. The court's
ruling in the instant case also appears adequately supported by
the lack of authentication of the offered evidence. It is reason-
able to expect, in the light of the greatly increasing governmental
activity, federal, state and local, and the increase in reporting
and record keeping that accompanies such activity, that this rule
will be subjected to considerable pressure. The Uniform Rules
and the Model Code suggest that the rule needs liberalization, 5
and development not unlike that in the analagous "business
entries" exception' 6 would not be a surprise.
Admissions-Multiple Admissibility
In Eberhardt v. Forrester"7 the issue was as to which driver
was at fault in a collision of automobiles. Shortly after the acci-
dent, some twenty minutes thereafter, the owner of one of the
cars, a used car dealer, arrived at the scene. The driver of the
dealer's car, a prospective customer, told the dealer in the pres-
ence of others, "These brakes are the hardest on this car that I
have ever seen on any car I have ever driven." To this the dealer
allegedly replied, "When the car left the shop the brakes were
ok." The trial judge excluded this testimony, offered by the
driver of the other car involved. The Supreme Court, per Justice
Bussey, held that this was error. The statement was an admis-
sion as to the driver of the used car, who was a party to the
litigation. As to the dealer, also a party, he was not entitled to
have the testimony excluded, but merely to a ruling to the jury
that it was admissible only against the driver. This appears to
be a correct application of the hearsay exception for "admis-
sions" and the doctrine of multiple admissibility. The statement
would not be admissible against the dealer if he were the only
party to the action, since it was not authorized 8 nor was it
14. 245 Mass. 405, 140 N.E. 465, 29 A.L.R. 281 (1923).
15. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE § 63 (15) ; MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE §§ 515-
516.
16. While some state courts have created broad common-law "business
entries" exceptions to the hearsay rule, the most fruitful progress has been
by statute, i.e., the FEDERAL BUSINESS RECORDS AcT, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732.
17. 241 S.C. 399, 128 S.E.2d 687 (1962).
18. McCoRmiCK, note 5 supra, § 244.
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acquiesced in or adopted by him.19 It is to be noted that the
statement was not "against interest" of the driver. If anything,
it was self-serving to him; but the admissions exception has no
requirement that the statement be against interest. The pro-
ponent of the evidence argued it was admissible as "res gestae,"
which also might be an adequate ground for admissibility.
Dying Declarations--"S'ettled Hopeless Ewapectaney of Death."
In State v. Bethea,20 defendant was convicted of manslaughter,
charged with shooting the victim, Mrs. Leona Prevatte, a widow.
Defendant pleaded self-defense. The state offered and the trial
court admitted in evidence as dying declarations statements of
the victim to a sheriff at the scene of the shooting and to a
nurse at the hospital where the victim died the next day. To both
she said that she was "going to die."21 The statement of the
sheriff included the following :22
.... Then she said, "Bill shot me." I asked her why he had
shot her and she said, "For no reason at all other than he
got mad." ....
The nurse testified that:
23
The first thing she said was that Bill Bethea shot her and
that she was going to die and she wanted him to pay for it.
Objection was made on two grounds: First, that the admission
of a dying declaration violated the constitutional right of a
defendant to confront witnesses against him ;24 and second, that
the evidence was insufficient to show that declarant had given
up all hope of recovery when the statement was made. The first
ground, the Supreme Court rejected peremptorily, only noting
that this exception to the hearsay rule was well established.
25
As to the second objection, the court noted that the trial court
had the primary responsibility of determining whether a proper
19. Id. § 246.
20. 241 S.C. 16, 126, S.E.2d 846 (1962).
21. 241 S.C. 16, 22-23, 126 S.E2d 846, 849 (1962).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. This argument, of course, could be equally applicable to all the hearsay
exceptions, but has been rejected as a ground for exclusion. McCoRaIcx, note
5 supra, § 231.
25. 241 S.C. 16, 23, 126 S.E2d 846, 849. "The objection on constitutional
grounds is athwart the decisions of this court, to which we adhere, and ap-
parently unanimous authority elsewhere.




Published by Scholar Commons,
202 SOUTH CA OLIN'TA LAw REvmw [Vol. 16
foundation had been laid to admit the dying declaration and
the court would be reversed only for a ruling "clearly incorrect
and prejudicial." The Supreme Court found adequate foundation
in the record to support the decision of the trial court 26
Vicaious statements-non-hearsay--"Res Gestae."
In the Homewood case 27 the state introduced into evidence the
testimony of one Roy Krell, a securities salesman registered as
agent of the defendant, who testified to the fraudulent "sales
pitch" which the defendant had directed him to make to pro-
spective purchasers. The state also introduced in evidence the
names of other agents of defendant, as indicated on the records
of the state securities commissioner. Purchasers of the stock then
testified as to what they had been told by these other agents
of defendant. Agents other than Krell did not testify. The
testimony of these purchasers was that the "sales pitch" of the
other agents was substantially the same as that testified to by
Krell. Defendant objected to the admission of the testimony
of the purchasers of stock as to what these other agents had told
them, on the ground that it was hearsay. The Supreme Court
rejected an exception on this point, holding that the testimony
was admissible as "res gestae." This would appear to be, without
question, a sound ruling. The statements were not hearsay, not
being offered for "the truth of the matter stated;" on the con-
trary, the state's whole case was that the statements were false.
The statements were being offered to show only that the state-
ments had been made; on this, the witnesses who heard the
statements were testifying to direct, observed experience of their
own.28 Whether the statements were admissible in evidence is
26. The victim was bleeding profusely and in pain and unable to move her
legs when she spoke to the sheriff. The doctor at the hospital found a "large
gaping hole" through her liver, and "tremendous hemorrhage." She was treated
with transfusions, but stayed in shock.
27. Note 12 supra.
28. The ruling demonstrates the utility of the label "res gestae" when applied
by a court as a convenient catch-all phrase to uphold admissibility without
further analysis. Such great names as Wigmore, Holmes and Learned Hand
can be cited for the proposition that the term "res gestae" is confusing and use-
less, and should be dropped from the legal vocabulary. But at least two of the
most able writers on the law of evidence find its usage aids the developing
law of evidence in a case like the present one. McCoRmICK ON EviDENCE § 274;
LADD, CAsES AND MARanIALS ON THE LAw or EVIDENCE, pp. 565-569 (2d ed.
1955).
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not a matter of the law of evidence, but of the substantive law, as
the court's opinion suggests. 29
BURDEN OF PRODUCING EVIDENCE, BURDEN OF
PERSUASION, AND PRESUMPTIONS.
Jake v. Jones30 is the kind of case in which the result often
turns on allocation of the burden of producing evidence, the
test for determining whether the burden has been met, and the
application of presumptions. Claimant applied for death bene-
fits under the workmen's compensation laws, arising out of the
death of her husband by drowning while he was at his place
of employment. No eye witnesses to the death were found, and
decedent's body was discovered, naked, in the water a few feet
from a dredge which his duty required him to operate. Hypo-
theses that he had drowned while swimming, against the rules
of the company, or while trying to deal with some unforeseen
circumstance which arose in connection with his work, were
tendered by the defense and the claimant, respectively. The
issue was whether death "arose out of and in the course of em-
ployment."31 The Commission found in favor of the claimant,
and the trial court affirmed the award. This was affirmed by
the Supreme Court, aided by the presumption that an employee
assigned a duty at a particular place would be carrying out his
duty and that if he should be found there, injured, the injury
arose out of the performance of the employment.3 2 The court
carefully analyzed the testimony and found it consistent with
the presumed fact.
Another recurrent and troublesome question in compensation
cases arises where the medical testimony cannot pinpoint causation
of a particular ailment, but can only state that an injury re-
ceived in employment is one of a number of possible causes.
G2ce v. Dickerson, Ine.s3 involved an employee who suffered
a hernia, admittedly in the course of employment, for which he
underwent surgery. He thereafter became totally disabled from
rheumatoid arthritis. The Commission found a causal connection
and awarded compensation for total disability. The circuit court
29. 241 S.C. 242, 128 S.E.2d 103. "Moreover, the statements of the salesmen
were admissible here as a part of the res gestae, being statements made at the
time of sale in connection with the sale of stock and being within the scope of
authority of such salesmen."
30. 240 S.C. 574, 126 S.E.2d 721 (1962).
31. S.C. CODE §§ 72-1 et. seq. (1952).
32. Citing Owens v. Ocean Forest Club, 196 S.C. 97, 12 S.E2d 839 (1941).
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reversed, finding no medical testimony to support the findings.
The medical testimony was to the effect that the cause of rheu-
matoid arthritis is not known, but that several precipitating
causes are recognized by medical science, including "infection,
dental infection, sinus infection, emotional shocks and stresses,
stress of a surgical operation, and injuries."34 None of the doc-
tors who testified could state a probable cause of the claimant's
total disability, but expressed their opinions in terms of possi-
bilities. The Supreme Court observed that under its prior de-
cisions85 were the medical testimony in the record the only
support for causation, it would be inadequate. Testimony that
the arthritis "most probably" was caused by the injury or
surgery would be required to support a finding for the claimant,
under those cases. In the instant case, however, the court found
that sole reliance was not placed on the medical testimony; the
circumstances surrounding and following the injury also shed
some light on causation or at least the Commission could so
find. The Supreme Court reinstated the award of the Industrial
Commission. A similar problem of causation arose in GosneZl v.
Bryant," in which the Commission found that the claimant had
failed to establish causation. The Supreme Court affirmed. In
Randolph v. Fiske-Carter,3 7 the Supreme Court held that the
standard of proof, medical testimony that the injury was "most
probably" caused by the accident, was met. There the doctor's
testimony was that "it is my considered professional opinion
that his injury and the subsequent complications following it
did very definitely have a bearing on his course and his death."38
Martin 'v. Southern Railway Co.8° dealt with allocation of the
burden of producing evidence. A union and the railway had a
contract whereby an employee could not be fired except for
cause. Plaintiff, an employee who had been fired for allegedly
drinking on the job or reporting for work under the influence,
brought an action for wrongful discharge. Reversing a directed
verdict for the railway and remanding for new trial, the Su-
preme Court held that the burden of producing evidence was
on the plaintiff insofar as showing the contract and the fact of
discharge was concerned, but on the railway to show that the
34. 241 S.C. 228, 127 S.E.2d 724 (1962).
35. Especially Cross v. Concrete Materials, 236 S.C. 440, 114 S.E.2d 828
(1960).
36. 240 S.C. 215, 125 S.E.2d 405 (1962).
37. 240 S.C. 182, 125 S.E.2d 267 (1962).
38. 240 S.C. 187, 125 S.E.2d 269 (1962).
39. 240 S.C. 460, 126 S.E.2d 365 (1962).
[Vol. 16
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discharge was not wrongful. In Hoffman v. County of Green-
ville,40 landowners brought an action alleging that the county
had changed the normal course of drainage in the area, result-
ing in the flooding of plaintiffs' lands. The county, in addition
to a general denial, pleaded that the cause of flooding was un-
usually heavy rains, which constituted an act of God for which
the county was not liable. The Supreme Court, citing the orth-
odox rule that the burden of proof (persuasion, in this instance)
falls on the party who has the affirmative on the issue under
the pleadings, stated that the defense would have the burden
on the second issue. However, the defense offered no proof on
the issue of act of God, so the court held that the trial court
had properly refrained from instructing the jury thereon. This
being so, the only defense in issue was the general denial; on
this issue, the plaintiff had the burden of persuasion. The case
was remanded because of language in the instructions placing
'the burden of persuasion on the defense.
RELEVANCY
Demonstrative Evidence and Experiments
Reid v. Striciland4 ' was an action on behalf of a three
year old girl for damages sustained in an automobile accident.
The girl allegedly had received facial injuries which required
plastic surgery and left disfiguring marks. The extent and na-
ture of her injuries were presented solely by expert medical tes-
timony; the child was not presented to the jury. Defendant
appealed the refusal of the trial judge to require exhibition of
the minor to the jury. The Supreme Court, pointing to medical
testimony in the record which indicated that much of the injury
suffered by the plaintiff would not be apparent to a layman by
observation, held that the matter was within the discretion of
the trial judge and affirmed. McDowell v. Floyd4 2 involved an
experiment, ex parte, conducted by a witness to determine at
what point an automobile could first be seen when approached
around a particular curve in the road. The witness went during
the night and at approximately the same time and place where
the accident had occurred, then approached the spot in his car
driving around the curve, and marked the place at which he
could first observe a car parked where the respondent's car had
40. 242 S.C. 34, 129 S.E.2d 757 (1963).
41. 242 S.C 166, 130 S.E.2d 416 (1963).
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been parked. The next day the witness offered to testify to his
experiment, and the testimony was received in evidence over
objection that the circumstances attending the experiment were
not the same as those at the time of the accident. The Supreme
Court reversed, pointing out that at the time of the accident,
according to the testimony of the appellant, Floyd, Floyd was
blinded by the lights of an on-coming pick-up truck and thus
could not see the parked car. At the time of the experiment,
there was no on-coming truck, thus the conditions of the ex-
periment were not sufficiently similar to permit the introduction
of the testimony.
Evidence of Insurance
In C/rocker v. Weathers,43 counsel for plaintiff stated in argu-
ment to the jury, "If you will write a verdict for the amount
we ask for in this complaint, I will collect at least $20,000." The
complaint had asked for $50,000 damages, actual and punitive.44
Defendant moved for a mistrial, which motion was denied. The
jury rendered a verdict for $15,000 actual and $10,000 punitive
damages.4 5 Defendant's motion for judgment N.O.V. or for a
new trial was denied. Circuit Judge Littlejohn, presiding at the
trial, recognized that the issue was more serious than mere men-
tion of insurance :40
S.. I don't think actually the inferences of insurance have
the impact that they originally had when the Supreme
Court handed down the rule. I am not at all sure but what
a jury assumes that everybody has got it now whether they
have or not .... What concerned me more in it was the
mention of a figure. Not only the possibility of an inference
of insurance, but going a little bit beyond a possible in-
ference, as to the amount. [This was Judge Littlejohn's oral
response to the requested ruling of a mistrial.]
After giving the matter further consideration, Judge Little-
john denied the motion for a new trial or judgment N.O.V. In
his order denying the motion, the learned trial judge said :47
:. . Every member of the jury who owns an automobile
is of necessity, well aware of the likelihood of liability in-
43. 240 S.C. 412, 126 S.E.2d 335 (1962).
44. RECORD, p. 4, 5.
45. Ibid, p. 52, 56.
46. Ibid, p. 49.
47. Ibid, p. 59.
[Vol. 16
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surance coverage, and this is especially true when close kin
folks are in litigation, as in this case.
This Court cannot, of course, change the rule of law as
laid down by the Supreme Court, but in determining whether
or not there has been prejudice such as to entitle the de-
fendants to a new trial, this Court should and does take
notice of the fact that the common law grows from day to
day, and the application of rules of common law should be
applied in the light of all of the changing circumstances
set forth hereinabove.
I therefore conclude that the remarks of counsel did not
advise the jury of liability insurance and were not of such
nature as to justify or require a new trial.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, in an opinion by
Mr. Justice Moss. The Court strongly reaffirmed its adherence
to the doctrine laid down in the Horsford case,48 but left to the
determination of the trial judge the question whether prejudice
resulted from the inference of insurance :9
. . . It is highly improper for counsel, in argument, to
advise the jury directly or by insinuation that the defendant
is covered by insurance. Where it is sufficiently clear that
insurance is implied by argument of counsel, this Court will
not hesitate to reverse a judgment obtained where such an
argument is made.
However, we must leave the control of argument of counsel
very much to the discretion of the trial judge, who is on the
scene of action and is in much better position than we are
to judge as to what is improper argument.
In the light of Judge Littlejohn's intimation that the litigation
was between close family members anyway, and the jury might
have assumed from this circumstance that insurance was in-
volved, this decision can be viewed as a very narrow one. Po-
tentially, the case might be a beginning of the weakening of the
Horsford rule. Dean McCormick, in four tightly reasoned
pages,5" has destroyed the logical foundations of that rule, reason-
ing much as did Judge Littlejohn in the trial court in the instant
case. Future decisions will reveal whether the Supreme Court
48. Horsford v. Carolina Glass Co., 92 S.C. 236, 75 S.E. 533 (1912).
49. 240 S.C. 425, 126 S.E.2d 341 (1962).
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will depart from its policy of insisting on a declaration of mis-
trial where a witness even inadvertently mentions insurance.5 '
WITNESS
Opinion Evidence
The two branches of the opinion evidence rule are now well
established.5 2 The expert witness, provided the subject is qual-
ified as one appropriate for expert testimony and the qualifica-
tions of the expert are established, is permitted to give his
opinion to aid the jury. The non-expert witness is supposed to
testify to "facts," not "opinions." Usually this means that he is
supposed to testify to his own observation or experience of the
particular event, in as concrete terms as the situation and the
flexibility of language will permit. Both aspects of the rule
arose in State v. Moorer.5 3 The testimony of a physician was
challenged by the appellant as incompetent, on the ground that
the qualifications of the expert were not shown, and the trial
judge had not expressly ruled that the expert was qualified. The
Supreme Court upheld the action of the trial judge in admitting
the testimony. The witness had testified that he was in the gen-
eral practice of medicine, and the court found that this was
sufficient to permit his testimony on medical matters. The court
found that the action of the trial judge in permitting the doctor
to testify was an implied ruling that he was an expert. As to the
lay testimony, a witness had testified that "it seems like I could
hear him saying .... "1 Appellant challenged this as an expres-
sion of mere opinion. The Supreme Court rejected the technical
argument, saying, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taylor :r
The qualification "it seems like" must be taken within the
context of the prosecutrix' testimony in determining its
meaning. As used by the prosecutrix the expression merely
indicates the degree of positiveness of her recollection as to
what defendant actually said and as such will not be ex-
cluded as being based on opinion rather than fact. Such
qualification affects merely the probative force of the
testimony.
51. For example, Haynes v. Graham, 192 S.C. 382, 6 S.E.2d 903 (1939).
52. McCoRMICx, Op. cit. supra note 50, §§ 10-18.
53. 241 S.C. 437, 129 S.E.2d 330 (1963).
54. 241 S.C. 497, 129 S.E.2d 335 (1963).
[Vol. 16
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Again, the prosecutrix testified as follows: 5 'IQ... did he
ravish you or commit rape?
A. Yes, sir."
Appellant contended that this was the expression of an opinion
on the "ultimate issue" and was prejudicial error. The court held
that this was an appropriate method by which the prosecution
could prove the element of penetration. These appear to be rul-
ings of eminent common sense, in accord with the best modem
thinking on the subject.
56
55. Ibid.
56. McCoamarcx, op. cit. supra note 50, pp. 23-28. MINIMUM STANDARDS
OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, 351-354 (1949) (American Bar As-
sociation, 1938 Recommendation, "That ordinary witnesses should be allowed
to state their conclusions with respect to ordinary matters subject to explanation,
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